Recognizing Taxpayers as Stakeholders in Municipal Bankruptcies by Dick, Diane Lourdes
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
Fall 2017 
Recognizing Taxpayers as Stakeholders in Municipal 
Bankruptcies 
Diane Lourdes Dick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Diane Lourdes Dick, Recognizing Taxpayers as Stakeholders in Municipal Bankruptcies, 14 J.L. Econ. & 
Pol'y 91 (2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/806 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
2017]




Recent large municipal bankruptcy cases have called into question the
rights of debtor-cities to impair their capital markets creditors, on the one
hand, and beneficiaries of their unfunded public pension promises, on the
other. As I show in a companion work,' federal bankruptcy law generally
allows debtors to impair each of these obligations. However, heightened
judicial scrutiny may apply to plans that are crammed down on public pen-
sion benefit recipients.2 Moreover, debtors and their stakeholders may still
agree for a variety of reasons to pursue restructuring plans that preserve
public pensions and impair the claims of capital markets creditors.'
But for all the focus on these two dominant creditor classes,' an im-
portant stakeholder-the debtor-city's taxpaying residents-has been large-
ly overlooked in the public discourse. By "taxpaying resident," I mean
persons who reside in the debtor-city and are subject to taxes (such as sales
and property taxes) that are assessed and levied by the debtor-city to sup-
port services and infrastructure. This key stakeholder is likely to play a
central role in the case, and is not only substantially impacted by the bank-
ruptcy filing but also capable of substantially impacting any proposed re-
structuring plan. This is because, in an emerging prototype of municipal
bankruptcy restructuring, debtor-cities slash services in the years and
months leading up to the bankruptcy filing, and also rely in large part on tax
increases to support their plans to exit bankruptcy with a stronger fiscal
1 Diane Lourdes Dick, Bondholders vs. Retirees in Municipal Bankruptcies: The Political Econ-
omy of Chapter 9, AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2018).
2 See Amended Opinion Regarding Confirmation and Status of CalPERS at 47, In re City of
Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. Feb. 4, 2015).
3 See, e.g., Daniel Gill, San Bernardino's Debt Adjustment Plan Approved, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Feb. 22, 2017) (reporting on San Bernardino's consensual Chapter 9 plan of adjustment that severely
impairs capital markets creditors while maintaining public pensions).
4 On the primacy of the conflict between bondholders, on the one hand, and public pension
claimants, on the other in municipal bankruptcy, see, e.g., Maria O'Brian Hylton, Central Falls Retirees
v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REv. 525 (2014);
Daniel Fisher, Municipal Bankruptcies Set Up War Between Pensioners and Bondholders, FORBES
(Apr. 3, 2013, 9:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/04/03/muni-bankruptcies-set-
up-war-between-pensionersand-bondholders/.
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foundation.' This Article considers whether and to what extent a debtor-
city's taxpaying residents are considered parties to the bankruptcy case, and
whether they should have formal representation and a seat at the bankruptcy
negotiation table. I join a small chorus of scholars and practitioners who
argue that taxpaying residents should be granted standing and formal repre-
sentation in the proceedings. To this body of work, I contribute an exami-
nation of whether and to what extent taxpaying residents are "stakeholders"
of municipal debtor-cities under prevailing stakeholder analysis methodol-
ogy.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces a detailed case
study of a recent large municipal bankruptcy, that of the City of Stockton,
California, paying particular attention to the ways in which taxpaying resi-
dents attempted unsuccessfully to interject in the proceeding and obtain an
official taxpayers committee. Part II introduces recent scholarly and prac-
tice-oriented literature exploring the role of taxpaying residents in Chapter
9 bankruptcy, and considers how these interested persons may be classified
under the Bankruptcy Code. This Part also contemplates the prevailing
wisdom and methods of stakeholder analysis to determine whether the in-
terests of taxpayers are adequately represented in prevailing Chapter 9 law.
and practice. Part III concludes.
I. CASE STUDY: STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA
This section introduces a large and prominent municipal bankruptcy
case-that of the City of Stockton, California-to provide a recent example
of taxpaying residents attempting to gain influence in a Chapter 9 bankrupt-
cy proceeding. By examining the arguments these taxpayers raised and the
responses they received from the other parties, I attempt to provide richer
context for the legal and theoretical questions taken up in subsequent sec-
tions.
On June 28, 2012, Stockton filed for bankruptcy protection in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California.6 The city's council
had disclosed earlier that year that the city was unable to meet its financial
obligations as they became due.' After months of mediation, city officials
determined that only bankruptcy would offer the necessary breathing room
5 The emerging prototypical municipal bankruptcy restructuring is described in Dick, supra note
1.
6 Voluntary Petition of City of Stockton, Californiajin re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-
32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. June 28, 2012).
7 Declaration of Marc A. Levinson at 2, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D.Cal. June 29, 2012).
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to deal with spiraling public pension costs, burdensome bond debts, and
other crippling secured and unsecured short- and long-term liabilities.
In declarations explaining the decision to file for bankruptcy, city offi-
cials painted a bleak picture of a municipality that had been severely im-
pacted by the housing bubble and bust. They described how tax revenues
dried up while expenses welled, leaving residents to endure "severe reduc-
tions in staffing and services, with serious repercussions to the safety and
welfare of the City's residents,"' delayed response by public safety depart-
ments, which "potentially places people and structures at greater risk," and
drastic reductions in community educational and recreational program-
ming." One official summarized the city's condition at the time of its
bankruptcy filing thusly: "The City is not only already cash-insolvent. It is
service-insolvent as well." 2 In other words, not only was the city unable to
pay for necessary services; it was also failing to provide them.
Stockton's petition for relief-like all municipal bankruptcy filings-
was governed by Chapter 9," a portion of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code4 de-
voted exclusively to the reorganization of municipalities, villages, counties,
taxing districts, municipal utilities, and school districts." Tucked between
Chapter 7,6 which addresses individual and business liquidations, and
Chapter 11,17 which deals primarily with individual and business reorgani-
zations, Chapter 9 strikes a delicate constitutional balance between the fed-
eral government's authority to regulate bankrupt persons and the state's
power to govern its political affairs." In legislative history, drafters
acknowledged that in Chapter 9, "[t]he powers of the court are subject to a
strict limitation-that no order or decree may in any way interfere with the
political or governmental powers of the petitioner, the property or revenue
of the petitioner, or any income producing powers."'9
Precisely because of these federalism concerns, Stockton's bankruptcy
would follow a different path than most consumer and business bankrupt-
8 Id.
9 Declaration of Laurie Montes at 8-9, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D.Cal. June 29, 2012).
10 Id. at 9.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 14.
13 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946.
14 All references herein to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code" are to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et.
seq.).
15 On the definition of "municipality," see Michael J. Deitch, Time for an Update: A New Frame-
work for Evaluating Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 2705 (2015).
16 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (providing for liquidations of bankrupt persons).
17 1 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (providing for reorganizations and liquidations ofbankrupt persons).
18 See generally 11 U.S.C. §904; Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298
U.S. 513, 538 (1936) (articulating the federalism issues inherent in municipal bankruptcy law).
19 121 CONG. REC. H39409-10 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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cies. For instance, unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 9 offers no mechanism for
liquidating assets and distributing proceeds to claimants. Instead, municipal
debtors must negotiate with their creditors and obtain consensus to (and
judicial confirmation of) a plan of adjustment to restructure debts and other
obligations.2 0 To this end, Chapter 9 bankruptcy process is similar to Chap-
ter 11, in that the outcome of the case is determined to a large extent by
party negotiations and settlements rather than judicial edict.2 1
But in Chapter 9, the U.S. Trustee and the bankruptcy court have even
less control over the conduct of the debtor.2 2 In fact, the court's exercise of
its judicial powers over a municipal debtor primarily occurs at the com-
mencement of the case, when the court must decide if the debtor is even
eligible for bankruptcy protection. A city such as Stockton seeking to ob-
tain relief under Chapter 9 must show that it is a municipality2 3 authorized
by the state to file for bankruptcy protection,2 4 that it is "insolvent" (mean-
ing for these purposes that the municipality is "generally not paying its
debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide
dispute; or.. .unable to pay its debts as they become due."),2 5 that it desires
to effect a plan to adjust its debts,2 6 and that it has negotiated in good faith
with its creditors or that such negotiations would be futile.2 7 The city bears
the burden of proving that it satisfies each eligibility requirement.28
In Stockton, the city's eligibility for bankruptcy protection was hotly
contested.2 9 In first-day filings, the city identified the California Public
Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS")-overseer of the city's em-
ployee pension plan-as its largest creditor, holding an estimated $148 mil-
lion contingent, unliquidated claim for unfunded pension costs.3 0 The city's
next largest debts consisted of approximately $124 million in pension obli-
gation bonds, $40 million in variable rate demand obligations, $35 million
in public facilities fees bonds, and $32 million in parking garage construc-
20 Plan confirmation requirements are set forth in 11 U.S.C. §943(b).
21 1 explore this phenomenon in the Chapter 11 context in Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11
Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759 (2013).
22 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012); Michael W. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities
Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993).
23 11 U.S.C. §l09(c)(1).
24 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(2).
25 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).
26 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(4).
27 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)..
28 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 289 (9th Cir.
BAP 2009).
29 See, e.g., National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation's Objection to the City of Stockton's
Qualifications, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. Aug. 8, 2012).
30 List of Creditors Holding 20 Largest Unsecured Claims, In re City of Stockton, California, No.
12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. June 28, 2012).
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tion bonds." Certain of these capital markets creditors32 complained that
the city had failed to negotiate in good faith with its creditors in an effort to
avoid bankruptcy; they pointed to the fact that the city sought concessions
from its capital markets creditors without seeking concessions from
CalPERS." In a pointed objection, one creditor alleged, "the City's entire
purpose in filing this case has been to force ... the... Capital Markets Credi-
tors to pay for otherwise-unfunded benefits to labor-including CalPERS'
ever-increasing pension benefit costs."34 CalPERS, for its part, argued that
the city's decision to pay pension-related claims in full and thereby main-
tain the relationship for the benefit of employees and retirees was a lawful
exercise of business judgment.3 5 Following a three day trial, the court de-
cided in March 2013 that the city was eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.
Attention then shifted to negotiating and finalizing the city's plan of
adjustment so that it could exit bankruptcy with restructured finances. In
Stockton, as in most large and complex bankruptcy cases, the most im-
portant, preliminary question was who would be recognized as having a seat
at the negotiation table. In other words, who would the debtor and the court
recognize as parties to the case, and what role would they be permitted to
play in the proceedings?
The question is more complex than it may initially appear. For in-
stance, although the debtor identified CalPERS as its largest creditor, the
true owners of retirement benefit claims were the city's approximately
2,400 retirees. These individuals were initially represented in pre- and
post-petition negotiations by the Association of Retired Employees of the
City of Stockton, which advocated not only with respect to public pension
benefits, but also with respect to retiree health care benefits.6 And of
course, CalPERS and the various employee labor unions advocated power-
fully on behalf of public pension benefit recipients. But the U.S. Trustee
would eventually appoint an official committee to also represent retirees.
The U.S. Trustee has the authority to form this and other official commit-
31 Id.
32 1 use the term "capital markets creditors" to refer generally to persons holding claims that
originated from capital markets transactions, such as bond issuances. In many bankruptcy cases, such
claims are held by bond insurers and other providers of financial guaranty insurance.
33 CaIPERS is the country's largest government worker pension fund. On the fund's history, see
generally Steven Malanga, The Pension Fund That Ate California: CaIPERS's corruption, insider
dealing, and politicized investments have overwhelmed taxpayers with debt, CITY JOURNAL, Winter
2013 (alleging that the fund's poor investment choices and mismanagement have crippled California's
public finances).
34 Supplemental Objection of Assured Guaranty Corp. and Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., In
re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. Dec. 14, 2012).
35 CaIPERS Brief in Support of the City of Stockton's Petition, In re City of Stockton, California,
No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. Feb. 15, 2013).
36 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, In re City of Stockton, California,
No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. July 1, 2013).
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tees because Chapter 9 broadly incorporates" a provision of Chapter 11 that
authorizes formation of "committees of creditors or of equity security hold-
ers as the [U.S. Trustee] deems appropriate."" Meanwhile, the city's capi-
tal markets creditors advocated on their own behalf during the proceedings.
This is because, in contrast to Chapter 11, unsecured creditors' committees
are not mandatory in Chapter 9. In further contrast to Chapter 11, Chapter
9 does not require debtors to shoulder the costs of attorneys and other pro-
fessionals retained by official committees,3 9 although debtors frequently
agree to do so anyway.
Of course, even if the debtor-city declines to assume the costs of
committee professionals, statutory committees still provide important bene-
fits for stakeholders.40 For one thing, official committees are generally re-
garded as having a seat at the negotiation table, meaning that courts will
expect debtors to work with them to achieve consensual resolution of con-
flicts. Moreover, so-called statutory committees have important discovery
rights, including the power to "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabili-
ties, and financial condition of the debtor."4 '
In light of these important benefits, another group attempted to gain
official committee status in Stockton. The self-described "Ad Hoc Taxpay-
ers of Stockton Working Group" began to interject in the proceedings and
also petitioned for an official taxpayers committee.42 Initially, the members
of the working group-five taxpaying residents of Stockton-were con-
cerned that the city's plan of adjustment contemplated tax increases; later,
they were concerned about the nature of the financial disclosures provided
by the city to the voting public.
Although a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment may depend on tax increases,
for increased revenue, the plan itself is not necessarily capable of imple-
menting the tax increase. This is because debtors are required to satisfy any
legal conditions precedent to taking proposed actions under a plan of re-
structuring,4 3 and this includes compliance with state or local laws requiring
37 11 U.S.C. §901.
18 IU.S.C.§1102.
39 11 U.S.C. §901 (omitting sections 327 through 331 of the Bankruptcy Code, which govern
matters relating to employment and compensation of professionals). It is important to note, however,
that Chapter 9 incorporates Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, which contemplates that any person
who can demonstrate that they have made a "substantial contribution" to the case may seek payment of
costs and expenses, including professional fees. 11 U.S.C. §901.
. 40 I've considered this argument in the somewhat analogous context of Chapter 11. Diane Lourdes
Dick, Grassroots Shareholder Activism in Large Commercial Bankruptcies, 40 J. CORP. L. 1 (2014). On
recent developments in leading cases, see Ana Lucia Hurtado, The Equity Committee Trend. When
Shareholders of a Bankrupt Company Hope to Get More Than Nothing, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2016.
41 11 U.S.C. §1103(c).
42 City's Submission of Response to Request for Appointment of Official Taxpayers' Committee
at 1, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. July 1, 2013).
43 11 U.S.C. §943(b)(4).
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voter approval of tax increases. Under the California State Constitution,
cities must obtain the approval of a majority of voters for any new or in-
creased general taxes, with a two-thirds majority approval required for any
new or increased special taxes." In first-day filings, city officials acknowl-
edged the difficulty of meeting or exceeding these vote thresholds: "Obtain-
ing voter approval for new taxes... is highly speculative under normal cir-
cumstances. It is even more uncertain given the City's historically high
rates of foreclosures and unemployment and public concern over the City's
past practices, including in establishing an overly generous retiree health
program and incurring debt it now cannot afford to pay."45
Despite the political challenges, Stockton's proposed plan of adjust-
ment relied upon a three-quarter cent sales tax increase ("Measure A")."
The debtor explained, "[t]his Plan is predicated upon passage of Measure
A. If Measure A fails to pass, the City will be compelled to implement a
plan of adjustment that further slashes staffing and services provided by the
City to its residents and will likely be unable to consummate the proposed
settlements."" Then, to comply with California law, the plan also contem-
plated that the city would place the tax measure on the November 2013
ballot to gain the requisite majority approval.
In the months leading up to the November 2013 election, members of
the taxpayers' working group were concerned that the city would not pro-
vide sufficient information about the nature of the increases and the intend-
ed uses of funds raised.48 Specifically, the working group complained that
the city publicly characterized tax increases as necessary to hire additional
police officers, but did not actually file detailed plan-related disclosures
containing any "enforceable commitment to hire and train police officers."49
They argued that an official taxpayers committee was necessary to help the
debtor overcome these and other deficiencies.
But the city vehemently opposed the appointment of an official tax-
payers committee on the grounds that such a committee was not explicitly
authorized by the Bankruptcy Code and, even if the Bankruptcy Code per-
4 Declaration of Vanessa Burke at 10, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D.Cal. July 3, 2012).
45 Id.
46 Plan of Adjustment at 76, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal.
Oct. 10, 2013). Although the draft proposed plan was not released until October, the City Council had
introduced Measure A months earlier at an emergency meeting. Ad Hoc Taxpayers Working Group's
Submission of Reply to City's Response to Request to Appoint Official Taxpayer Committee at 2, In re
City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. July 8, 2013).
47 Plan of Adjustment at 76, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal.
Oct. 10, 2013).
48 Ad Hoc Taxpayers Working Group's Submission of Reply to City's Response to Request to
Appoint Official Taxpayer Committee at 2, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D.Cal. July 8, 2013.
49 Id. at 3.
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mitted formation of such a committee, "such an appointment would be an
affront to the only legitimate representatives of the taxpayers of Stockton-
the duly elected City Council.""o Drawing an analogy to a 2001 case in
which a court overseeing a utility company's bankruptcy restructuring de-
clined to order the appointment of an official ratepayers committee, the city
argued that there is simply no legal basis for forming a taxpayers commit-
tee." Moreover, the debtor pointed to the City Charter, which establishes a
City Council, concluding that it is "flat out wrong" to claim that taxpayers
have no representation.52
In a responsive pleading, the members of the working group agreed to
table their demand for an official taxpayers committee.53 However, they
rearticulated their view that the debtor "needs the support of the taxpayers"
in order to realize its plan of adjustment, and admonished the debtor for its
outright "hostility" towards the working group.54 Suggesting that taxpayers
could not rely upon elected leaders to adequately represent them, the work-
ing group described the findings of a recent state audit of city finances:
"The audit found the City's audit controls were ineffective... .In summary,
the audit report states, 'We found the potential for waste, fraud and abuse of
public resources is extremely high due to numerous deficiencies."" The
working group also emphasized its demand that "adequate information [be
made] available for all of the City's taxpayers to review the City's plan of
adjustment and make a decision on the tax increase.""6 Finally, the working
group argued that the members of the working group--whether as an ad
hoc or official committee-had an important role to play in the case: "The
Working Group stands for transparency regarding the tax increase and the
bankruptcy process-which the residents of Stockton are not receiving and
the City seems determined to prevent."57
In the weeks and months that followed, the working group continued
to intervene in the case to advance three goals: "to analyze and review on
behalf of taxpayers the proposed tax increase.. to ensure the Debtor's pro-
posed plan provides the taxpaying residents a sufficient and reasonably
acceptable level of health, safety and welfare services, and.. .to work with
50 City's Submission of Response to Request for Appointment of Official Taxpayers' Committee
at 2, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. July 1, 2013).
51 Id. at 3. (discussing Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion for Order Vacating Appoint-
ment of Committee of Ratepayers, In re Pacific Gas & Electric Co., No. 01-30923 (Bankr. N.D.Cal.
May 21, 2001).
52 Id.
53 Ad Hoc Taxpayers Working Group's Submission of Reply to City's Response to Request to
Appoint Official Taxpayer Committee at 3, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D.Cal. July 8, 2013).
54 Id. at 1.
55 Id. at 2.
56 Id. at 2.
57 Id. at 3.
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the Debtor and all of the constituencies to ensure the plan of adjustment is
feasible.. .and fiscally sustainable."" Over the working group's objections,
the City Council unanimously approved putting the sales tax increase on the
November 2013 ballot, clarifying that 35% of the associated tax revenues
would go towards the city's general fund, while 65% would be used to en-
hance public safety." Meanwhile, the City Council warned that if the tax
measure failed to pass, financial consequences for the city would be pro-
found: "Parks and libraries would be shut altogether. The fire department
budget, already reduced 37 percent, would be cut an additional 14 per-
cent."60 In the campaigning period, supporters of the tax measure primarily
argued that the new revenue was needed to bring about an end to the bank-
ruptcy case, and that it was the only way to prevent additional service re-
ductions and restore services that had been cut in the months and years
leading up to the bankruptcy case.'
But it also appears that there was at least some misinformation circu-
lated during the campaign. For instance, the "Secure Stockton" movement
argued: "Municipal Bankruptcy (Chapter 9) does not eliminate the City's
debt. Rather, it will restructure those debts in a way that buys time for our
economy and revenues to grow, enabling the City to pay off the debt in the
most equitable manner possible."62 This statement was made notwithstand-
ing the fact that the city had already proposed severely impairing its capital
markets creditors.
In a November 2013 election with a mere 21 percent voter turnout,6
the Measure A narrowly passed, with just under 52 percent of voters favor-
ing the tax increase.65 And in early 2015, Stockton gained court approval of
a plan of adjustment that implemented the tax increase, preserved the city's
relationship with CalPERS in order to maintain retiree and employee pen-
58 Joinder of Ad Hoc Taxpayers Working Group to Dean Andal's Motion for Relief From Auto-
matic Stay, Ad Hoc Taxpayers Working Group's Submission of Reply to City's Response to Request to
Appoint Official Taxpayer Committee at 2, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D.Cal. Aug. 5, 2013).
59 Ian McDonald, Stockton City Council Votes Unanimously to Put Sales Tax Hike on Ballot,
Fox40 (July 10, 2013).
60 Alan Greenblatt, What It's Like Living in a Bankrupt City, NPR (Sept. 6, 2013).
61 CITY OF STOCKTON SALES TAX INCREASE AND ASSOCIATED ADVISORY VOTE, MEASURES A
AND B (November 2013),
https://ballotpedia.org/Cityof StocktonSalesTax_IncreaseandAssociated A visoryVote,Measur
esA and B_(November_2013) (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Plan of Adjustment, In re City of Stockton, California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal.
Oct. 10, 2013).
6 Stockton Election Measures Pass, Election Turnout At 21 Percent, CBSLOCAL (Nov. 5, 2013).
65 CITY OF STOCKTON SALES TAX INCREASE AND ASSOCIATED ADVISORY VOTE, supra note 60;
see also Alison Vekshin, Stockton Approves Sales-Tax Hike to Ease Bankruptcy Exit, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 5, 2013).
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sions, terminated certain ancillary retiree health care benefits, and also im-
paired capital markets creditors.66
In the years following Stockton, several prominent lawyers and aca-
demics have revisited the question of whether and to what extent taxpayers
should participate as parties in interest to their city's Chapter 9 proceedings.
The following Part explores these works and also contributes a novel theory
of taxpayer participation and representation in municipal bankruptcies that
is grounded in stakeholder analysis.
II. DISCUSSION: RECONSIDERING TAXPAYERS AS STAKEHOLDERS
The issue of taxpayer participation and representation in Chapter 9
bankruptcy cases continues to be relatively understudied. However, alt-
hough this is still fairly uncharted terrain, there have been some thoughtful
and highly germane scholarly and practice-oriented contributions in the
years following Stockton. Through legal, historical, and empirical analysis,
these works help to shed new light on the questions surrounding taxpayer
participation in municipal bankruptcy cases.
For instance, in a 2014 piece, bankruptcy attorney Christine
Schleppegrell explored the threshold question: whether taxpaying residents
are even "parties in interest" to a Chapter 9 case.67 The inquiry is not as
straightforward as it may initially appear, as Chapter 9 only explicitly con-
fers party status on a narrow subcategory of taxpayers. In a municipal
bankruptcy case, "special tax payers"6 - meaning the owners of property
that is the subject of a special assessment or tax levy-may object to con-
firmation of a plan that affects their interests.69
Beyond this narrow provision, taxpayers of a bankrupt municipality
have standing to the extent they come within a much broader definition of
"party in interest," which originates in Chapter 11 and is incorporated by
reference into Chapter 9.70 That provision provides that only a "party in
interest" has a right to "raise and... appear and be heard on any issue.""
The term "party in interest" is defined to include "the debtor, the trustee, a
creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an
equity security holder, or any indenture trustee."72 Courts have traditionally
construed the inclusive definition broadly to permit board participation in
66 Amended Opinion Regarding Confirmation and Status of CaIPERS, In re City of Stockton,
California, No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D.Cal. Feb. 27, 2015).
. 67 Christine A. Schleppegrell, Can Taxpayers Leverage the Ambiguity of "Party-in-Interest" to
Enter the Chapter 9 Arena?, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (2014).
68 11 U.S.C. §902(3).
69 11 U.S.C. §943(a); II U.S.C. §902(4).
70 11 U.S.C. §901.
71 11 U.S.C. §1109.
72 Id.
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the case. Meanwhile, federal rules of bankruptcy procedure also authorize
courts to allow intervention by persons that do not otherwise have standing
to participate in the case.74 In exercising their discretion, courts should
"balance the needs of a potential intervenor against any delay or prejudice
which [will] result from such intervention." In making the determination,
courts typically focus on economic interests and whether the intervenors are
already represented by parties in interest.76
Despite these broad and permissive standards for intervention in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, Schleppegrell's survey of case law shows how, because
of federalism concerns unique to Chapter 9, taxpayers have struggled to
overcome a judicial presumption that they are merely "peripheral parties" to
municipal bankruptcy cases.n The greatest challenges appear to be at the
eligibility stage of a Chapter 9 case, when it may not be clear whether and
to what extent the plan of adjustment will impact taxpayers. In contrast,
landowning taxpayers have had some success intervening at the confirma-
tion stage of the proceedings, particularly if the debtor has proposed tax
increases as part of its plan of adjustment. Where courts have refused to
grant taxpayers standing, they have cited the narrow purposes of Chapter 9
bankruptcy to effectuate debt adjustments, and the importance of respecting
the municipality's right to manage its own policy choices and political af-
fairs.7 1 In order to make the requisite showing of a practical stake and pe-
cuniary interest in the outcome of the case sufficient to overcome these
judicial trepidations, the author recommends that taxpayers seeking to in-
tervene in a Chapter 9 case emphasize "the effect that [any proposed] tax
will have on individual citizens' finances," particularly as it relates to ongo-
79 *ing tax obligations and any impacts on property values. Similarly, they
should address any reductions in services that have occurred or that are
likely to occur.o
Professor Christine Sgarlata Chung also argues in a 2015 article" that
taxpaying residents should have standing in Chapter 9 cases; moreover,
Professor Chung responds to arguments that taxpaying residents are already
adequately represented by their elected officials. Examining legislative
history of Chapter 9, she reminds that the drafters always recognized the
73 See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, 101 B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re FRG, Inc., 107
B.R. 461 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Public Service Co., 88 B.R. 546 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
74 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018.
75 In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 651 (citing In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R.
686, 687 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)).
76 See id.
77 Schleppegrell, supra note 67, at 20.
78 See In re Addison Community Hosp. Authority, 175 B.R. 646 (1994).
79 Schleppegrell, supra note 67, at 61-62.
80 Id.
81 Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Bankruptcy, Essential Municipal Services, and Taxpayers'
Voice, 24 WIDENER L.J. 43 (2015).
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important role residents and taxpayers play in the case, given the municipal
debtor's unique status as a provider of essential public services.8 2 She pre-
sents a compelling case study from Detroit's recent Chapter 9 filing, pars-
ing through judicial decisions that emphasize the city's service insolvency
and the devastating effects of the lack of basic services and infrastructure
on city residents and taxpayers. Professor Chung argues that notwithstand-
ing the obvious federalism issues that likely prevented the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code from requiring formal representation of taxpaying resi-
dents in bankruptcy proceedings, courts should use their discretion to grant
taxpayers standing in appropriate cases. For instance, taxpaying residents
should have standing to intervene where "[e]lected representatives may be
compromised by corruption or special interest[, or where... a]ppointed offi-
cials may lack political legitimacy."8 3
In a similar way, Professor Scott Pryor also tackled the question of
taxpayer participation in Chapter 9 in a 2015 article.84 He pushed the enve-
lope even further, arguing that taxpaying residents should not only be
granted standing, but should also be afforded an opportunity to participate
meaningfully in the proceedings through official taxpayers committees. He
notes that because taxpayers are not classified as creditors under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, they are not entitled to vote on the debtor's proposed plan of
adjustment, "which weakens whatever bargaining power they have."" He
then considers the essential role of taxpayers in systems of governance,
comparing and contrasting them to equity security holders of corporate
debtors: "Taxpayers do not, of course, have a residual interest in municipal
assets. On the other hand, taxpayers' long-term losses are not limited to the
amount of their investment; their property is liable in perpetuity for the fi-
nancial misfortunes of their municipality."" Moreover, he theorizes that
while taxpayers do not receive distributions of property from the municipal
debtor, they arguably receive distributions in the form of the ongoing ser-
vices provided by the city to all residents." Thus, "[a] plan that increases
taxes is like a capital call on corporate shareholders, something that is not
required under state or federal bankruptcy law."" For all of these reasons,
he argues that taxpaying residents should be presumed to be parties in inter-
est, entitled to an official taxpayers committee to represent hem in the pro-
82 Id. at 55-56.
83 Id. at 79.
84 C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer Participation in Chapter 9, 24
WIDENER L.J. 81 (2015).
85 In deciding that taxpayers are not creditors, Professor Pryor considers the Bankruptcy Code's
definition of the term "creditors" which refers to persons holding "claims" against the debtor. Id.; see
also II U.S.C. §101(5); 11 U.S.C. §101(10).
86 Id. at 82.
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ceedings.90 He also argues that the debtor should bear the reasonable costs
and expenses of the official taxpayers committee, including attorneys'
fees.91
Meanwhile, Professor Jack Beermann has also examined the role of
taxpayers in Chapter 9 in the course of an ambitious scholarly project yield-
ing two recent articles on the public pension crisis.92 Professor Beermann
frames the issues regarding taxpaying residents and their interests in the
case differently, though, arguing that, to the extent public pensions remain
unfunded, the city's residents and taxpayers have been the primary benefi-
ciaries. After all, they have enjoyed the services of city employees without
fully compensating them for their labor.93 In his view, the public pension
crisis is the result of a deliberate, political strategy: "The primary pathology
that led to the underfunding of public pensions is the political desire to pro-
vide more services to the public than the public is willing to pay for in cur-
rent taxation."94 Thus, to the extent a financially distressed municipality
must allocate economic burdens between employees and retirees, on the
one hand, and taxpaying residents, on the other, the economic burdens
should be allocated to the latter.95
But the question of whether and how to allocate economic burdens in
Chapter 9 is a separate question; presumably, this will be the focus of plan-
related negotiations and confirmation proceedings. Thus, whether one be-
lieves that taxpaying residents hould bear some, most, or even all of the
economic burdens of the city's financial condition, it seems that taxpaying
residents would still be recognized as important stakeholders, with more
than a mere peripheral interest in the outcome of the case. To this end, an
exercise known as stakeholder analysis," which derives from business
management studies, may provide additional assistance for courts seeking
to determine whether and to what extent taxpaying residents should join the
bankruptcy negotiation table.
This theoretical approach, which has been applied in recent years to
other legal questions,97 invites the analyst to focus on identifying and map-
90 Id. at 118-19.
91 Id.
92 Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Public Pension "Crisis, " 41 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 999
(2015) [hereinafter '2015 Article"]; Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3 (2013) [hereinafter, "2013 Article"].
93 Beermann, 2013 Article, supra note 92.
94 Beermann, 2015 Article, supra note 92.
95 Id.
96 See generally R. K. Mitchell, et. al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Sali-
ence: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. OF MANAGEMENT REv. 853
(1997).
97 See generally Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegali-
ty (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REv. 1279
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ping the stakeholders who are likely to be impacted by a plan, project, or
transaction. Thoughtful consideration is given to how these stakeholders
may influence the transaction, as well as how the transaction is likely to
influence their interests. Sophisticated stakeholder analyses do not simply
take it as a given that a particular stakeholder is represented by another
stakeholder; rather, these direct and indirect relationships are explored so
that parties may be properly classified as primary and secondary stakehold-
ers." Although the precise terms may vary, most analysts recognize some
category of primary stakeholders, who are generally those likely to be most
affected by the transaction and most critical for its long-term success, and
some category of secondary stakeholders, who are less impacted by the
transaction and less vital for its long-term success." Meanwhile, leading
proponents of stakeholder analysis urge analysts to appreciate the "intrinsic
value" of stakeholders, reminding them that "they need to be treated as
'ends' rather than 'means' to succeed in achieving... objectives."'0
I Applying the prevailing insights and methods of stakeholder analysis
to Chapter 9 bankruptcy, it appears that taxpaying residents are classifiable
as one of the most important, primary stakeholders of a debtor-city. In their
capacity as residents, they have likely endured reductions in services caused
by the municipality's financial distress, and may have even suffered
through service insolvency in the months or years leading up to the bank-
ruptcy filing. They also depend on the city for its continued provision of
necessary services and infrastructure. And, in their capacity as taxpayers,
they are critical to the success of the plan of adjustment, particularly to the
extent that it relies on tax increases. To the extent the debtor-city must ob-
tain voter approval, then those taxpaying residents who are also voters will
be even more directly critical to the success of the plan of adjustment. But
even where a plan does not contemplate tax increases, it most likely relies
on the continued maintenance of the city's existing tax revenue base, which
is often the dominant source of municipal revenue. To the extent the debt-
or-city proposes impairing capital markets creditors, tax revenue will likely
be even more important to the city in the future, as debt financing may not,
be as readily available.
Of course, within or outside of bankruptcy, taxpaying residents con-
tinue to be represented by their elected officials. But is this representation
adequate for the purposes of representing their interests in bankruptcy? Like
Professor Chung, I believe taxpayer representation i  Chapter 9 is especial-
ly important when the political legitimacy of the municipal government has
(2001); Christopher R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 219 (2013).
. 98 See, e.g., GREGOR GossY, A STAKEHOLDER RATIONALE FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 6 (2007)
(summarizing stakeholder analysis literature).
. 99 Id.
100 Id. at 8.
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been compromised. But even where political legitimacy it not at issue,
stakeholder analysis cautions that city officials are also stakeholders in their
own right, with unique interests and motivations that may conflict with the
interests and motivations of taxpaying residents. For instance, city officials
may feel pressure to satisfy the demands of other, powerful stakeholders,
such as public pension claimants or capital markets creditors. These inter-
ests may compel them to work towards a plan of adjustment that placates
powerful parties by allocating economic burdens to more widely dispersed
stakeholders who do not have their own seat at the bankruptcy table, such
as taxpaying residents. City officials may also overemphasize short-term
goals and outcomes, particularly to the extent they are focused on their
reelection prospects or on salvaging their own political or professional
reputations. Taxpaying residents, on the other hand, are likely to focus on
longer-term goals and outcomes, such as factors impacting property values
over time and the quality of services and infrastructure that may benefit
their children and grandchildren."'
Rather than causing a breakdown in democratic governance functions,
bankruptcy courts that recognize taxpaying residents as parties in interest
and grant them official committee status may actually help to facilitate im-
portant conversations between and among these important stakeholder clas-
ses. For instance, in jurisdictions that require voter approval of tax increas-
es, allowing taxpaying residents to participate in the bankruptcy case may
help to improve communication between municipal debtors and the voting
public, and increase voter turnout for these important decisions. An official
committee may, for instance, provide review of official statements from x
city officials to the voting public with respect to any proposed tax increases,
and may also help to translate complex bankruptcy documents-including
the debtor's proposed plan of adjustment-into information that taxpaying
residents can more readily understand and appreciate. Similar to an adviso-
ry committee or citizen commission outside of bankruptcy, an official tax-
payers committee may give taxpaying residents a vehicle to share their per-
spectives, consider proposals, and make recommendations to the debtor-
city. For instance, an official committee could be empowered to collect
public testimony and commission studies to help inform the debtor and the
court on the needs and concerns of taxpaying residents. These are the roles
presently played by official retirees committees in municipal bankruptcy,
based upon the tacit recognition by bankruptcy courts that city officials,
labor unions, and even the pension plan administrator may not be able to
engage fully with the constituency to advance its interests. Taxpaying resi-
101 The unique interests and concerns of taxpayers is more broadly recognized in longstanding laws
governing taxpayer standing outside of bankruptcy. See generally Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored
Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer
Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 1263 (2012) (exploring federal and state laws governing
taxpayer standing).
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dents are a similarly dispersed class of interested persons, and would bene-
fit from comparable treatment. And, by enhancing stakeholder participation
in this way, bankruptcy courts may also enhance the fairness and transpar-
ency of municipal bankruptcy process for the benefit of all constituents.
CONCLUSION
A Chapter 9 debtor-city's taxpaying residents are key stakeholders
who should be recognized as parties in interest with standing to participate
in the bankruptcy proceedings. Taxpaying residents should also be entitled
to form an official committee, which may serve an important advisory and
communication function with respect to important decisions in the case.
Although taxpaying residents continue to be represented by their elected
officials within and outside of bankruptcy, stakeholder analysis suggests
that this may not be adequate representation for the purposes of the bank-
ruptcy case and the difficult decisions that must be made to restructure mu-
nicipal finances. Whether or not a plan of adjustment contemplates tax
increases, and whether or not those increases require voter approval, tax-
paying residents are among the most important stakeholders with unique
interests that do not necessarily align with the interests of other stakehold-
ers.
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